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The Politics of Neutrality in the Post-
Ukraine Crisis Political Climate 
Cases of Finland and Sweden 
 
Introduction 
“The end of the Cold War did not lead to an eternal peace – classical realism and 
geopolitics are infallibly fit in parts of today's world” said the Defence Minister of 
Finland, Jussi Niinistö  in a seminar in 2015 (Eskola 18). Relatively present issues, such 
as the crisis in Ukraine and the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, have 
shown that changes in the security environment can happen rapidly. Such events have 
led to ice cold relationship between NATO and Russia, who taunt one another in the 
Baltic Sea region. Finland and Sweden are located in a strategic hotspot between the two 
belligerents that are nearly bursting at the seams. Despite being neutral or militarily 
non-aligned as they prefer, both of the states have gotten their share of Russian “roulette” 
while standing one foot through NATO's door. After the Ukraine Crisis and increased 
Russian activity in the Baltic Sea region, both Finland and Sweden have adjusted their 
foreign and security policies from an international focus to national. Other historical 
events too have left fingerprints in the White Papers of Finland and Sweden: during the 
Cold War, both states arguably were neutral – when joining the European Union in 1992, 
both Finland and Sweden reformed their neutral stance to military non-alignment, 
which allowed them to politically align with the rest of Europe. 
 This study is, however, interested in the present day neutrality because as pointed 
out above, the security environment has changed. Questions about neutrality and 
military non-alignment have become ever more relevant when one thinks of, for example, 
the recent “Brexit” vote and Great Britain resigning from the European Union, which on 
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its own will mold the security architecture within European Union as Great Britain is the 
strongest military power in Europe. Great Britain's exit from the European Union will 
leave a significant dent into the Common Foreign and Security Policy as well as to the 
security guarantees of the European Union, which could necessitate other security 
options. Furthermore, NATO Warsaw summit takes place in July and in which Finland 
and Sweden take seat through their participation in NATO programs such as Partnership 
for Peace (PfP) and Enhanced Opportunities Program (EOP). Because of the tense 
atmosphere in the Baltic Sea region, discussions and questions about Finnish and 
Swedish NATO membership have become even louder. Increased Russian activity and the 
“arms race” between NATO and Russia have left Finland and Sweden with a geopolitical 
dilemma in which there is no simple yes or no answer. Therefore, it is important to 
update the scholarly world by researching neutrality in today's setting. For this purpose, 
the following question is to be asked and answered: What implications the Finnish and 
Swedish traditions of neutrality have for the NATO membership of Finland and Sweden in 
the post-Ukraine crisis political climate? 
 The present study has been outlined as follows. The first chapter reviews existing 
academic literature, defines the key definitions and thus sets the present study into a 
wider academic context. The second chapter introduces the research design. The 
research design section includes theoretical frameworks and methodology, in which the 
method, cases, scope and data are elaborated on. Chapter three is the analytical chapter. 
There, after conducting analysis through two different types of theoretical lenses, the 
findings are discussed, elaborated and applied to the research question. 
Literature review 
This study aims to find out what implications neutrality has to both Finnish and Swedish 
foreign policy and alliance formation in present day setting, as well as whether 
neutrality is a viable policy option in 21st century. This section is designated for 
reviewing relevant academic literature. Primarily, the review has been conducted on 
academic literature that discusses neutrality and its contemporary forms because the 
research is in essence interested in neutrality as a foreign policy in 2016. Preliminary 
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findings from the selected literature suggest that while a large majority of the relevant 
literature focuses on the evolution of neutrality and its application to foreign policy, 
there is paucity of theoretical grounding, as well as absence of literature that covers 
politics of neutrality in the political climate of post-Ukraine crisis and Russian 
intervention. The literature review has been organized into two sections: The first part 
focuses on definitions of neutrality as well as briefly discusses literature that has focused 
on the pacifying potential of neutrality. The second part focuses on post-Cold War 
neutrality, “post-neutrality” and the role of neutrality in 21st century foreign and security 
policies. 
Defining Neutrality 
To begin with, a number of academics see neutrality as a political position in which a 
state practices distance and impartiality to great power politics (Möller and Bjereld 364; 
Lödén 281; Ogley 1; Karsh 1988: 57). Others understand neutrality as a wide spectrum 
of different types of “neutralities” that have served different purposes at different times: 
according to Binter and Andrén, neutrality can be considered as ad hoc, de jure or de 
facto1, depending on the (geo)political context (Binter 388; Andrén 69-70). In this regard, 
Sweden and especially Finland were arguably not de facto neutral during the Cold War, 
but were, as in the Finnish case, ad hoc neutral or even neutralized by the Soviet Union 
through the Finno-Soviet treaty of 19482 and because of attempting to avoid any further 
escalations. In his introductory chapter on neutrality, Roderick Ogley has further 
distinguished three more types of neutrality: neutralization - where neutrality is 
imposed through an international agreement, as in the case of Finland; traditional 
neutrality - where a state chooses to be neutral, as in the case of Sweden; and finally 
nonalignment, which is an active policy of remaining outside of blocs (communist and 
western) and of averting a major war between these blocs (2-4). From a legal 
perspective, Chadwick has introduced the concept of “traditional armed neutrality” 
which according to her means war time neutrality, to contain the spread of war by 
                                                 
1
 Ad hoc neutrality means that a state is neutral in one conflict but has a different position in another. De jure 
neutrality means that a state is neutral according to (international) law. De facto neutrality means that a state is 
neutral in practice but its neutrality has not been recognized by (international) law. 
2
 Refers to The Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (YYA treaty) from 1948 to 1992 
between Finland and the Soviet Union. 
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remaining impartial and uninvolved, yet having the ability to adopt military means to 
defend their neutrality (1-3), while authors such as Törngren have argued that neutrality 
as a legal concept is meaningless outside wartime (601).   
 Another formal term for neutrality is presented by Agius and Devine, who define 
perpetual neutrality as preservation of neutral stance both in war and peace, in some 
cases through constitution or a treaty (267), while neutralization is neutrality imposed 
by an outside power (268). Furthermore, Joenniemi has identified neutrality in which 
deterrence is vital for the survival of a neutral state, emphasizing the role of neutrality as 
a military dimension; and the concept of active neutrality which focuses on international 
and transnational actions such as peacekeeping (179). Active neutrality also emphasizes 
state’s proactive role as a peace builder and as a norm entrepreneur in international 
community as well as a state pursuing active foreign policy (Joenniemi 179, active 
neutrality also in Andrén 79-80). 
 While there are myriad ways to define neutrality depending on the framework it 
is used in, most observers seem to agree that in essence, and at its simplest, neutrality 
means impartiality in a war and also an alternative to alliances (Hakovirta 564), which 
also is the definition of neutrality for the purposes of the present research. However, in 
the context of 21st century foreign and security policies of Finland and Sweden, 
neutrality as such and in its broadest sense is a rather outdated.3 Neutrality is a very 
elastic concept with a continuum from absolute neutrality to absolute alliance 
(Hakovirta 564), as will be apparent also in the later parts of the literature review which 
delve more into the scions of neutrality in the period of post-Cold War and all the way to 
the present-day. 
 The pacifying nature of neutrality in combination with international institutions 
has been researched by a number of authors. Binter argued that as a resource for peace, 
neutrality lacks general applicability (396), meaning that neutrality can be utilized only 
in specific conditions instead of neutrality being a globally accepted resource for peace. 
As a counter argument, Karsh claimed that neutrals brought neutrality to the awareness 
                                                 
3
 In the sense that it has been replaced with other, more specific discourses, such as military non-alignment, in 
relevant governmental documents. 
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of global society by participating in international institutions such as the United Nations, 
all while removing the old image of neutrality as isolationist and antisocial policy (1988: 
66). On the contrary, Karsh observed differences in political ramification of neutrality 
and cooperation that vary within and between regions and universal spheres as became 
apparent in the way Soviet Union felt about Finnish cooperation with the European 
community (66). In addition, Joenniemi suggested that although neutrality suffered from 
theoretical paucity as well as from issues on regional and transnational level, it had 
peace potential had it focused on normative pacifying civilian processes instead of realist 
military missions (175-182). 
 In the era of the Cold War, military strength and balance of power between the 
blocs were important factors when it came to success of neutrality, to the extent that 
Hägglöf, studying Sweden's neutrality, highlighted the necessity of balance of power for 
successful policy of neutrality (166). In a more recent work Andrén takes the factors of 
successful neutrality even further by claiming that without the combination of legal, 
political and resource-related credibility,4 a neutral state lacks respect from the 
international community (73). Moreover, according to Törngren, mutual distrust 
between neighbors can cause failure of neutrality as became apparent during the Second 
World War in the case of Finland and Soviet Union (603). 
 The aforementioned arguments suggest that during the post-Second World War 
balance of power, neutrality had peace potential yet it is highly unlikely that neutrality, 
despite its myriad definitions, is globally recognized as a universal resource of 
deterrence. While neutrality can be respected by the international community, it is not 
necessarily respected by regional actors. This uncertainty of neutrality and its variants 
as guarantees of deterrence echo in present-day politics, policies and public opinion in 
both Finland and Sweden and it leaves a question to be asked, is neutrality a viable 
policy in 2016? 
 
                                                 
4
 Andrén demonstrates that in the cases of Finland, Switzerland and Sweden all three factors were present but 
were emphasized differently because of geopolitical reasons: due to Soviet Union Finland highlighted the role of 
political aspects, Switzerland focused on legal credibility while Sweden exercised stronger emphasis on defence 
(73). 
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Post-Cold War, Post-Neutrality and 21st Century Foreign Policy 
This section reviews literature that discusses neutrality in several contexts: neutrality in 
the climate of Post-Cold War, the concept of post-neutrality and finally neutrality in 21st 
century foreign policy, with the focus on Finland and Sweden. Without a doubt, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War are immensely significant 
because in the post-Cold War, the Soviet Union ceased to be the main threat, while 
security was redefined in a broader sense. Post-Cold War is also when Finland and 
Sweden simultaneously joined the NATO Partnership for Peace program in 1994, the 
European Union in 19955 and in 2009 the duo joined the Nordic Defence Cooperation 
NORDEFCO with Denmark, Iceland and Norway.6  The importance of the period is also 
highlighted by the fact that Baltic states joined NATO in 2004, but at the time there were 
only debates of NATO membership in both Finland and Sweden but no actual attempts to 
become members. 
 Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet Union, thereby the end of the Cold War 
and the movement from bi-polar to unipolar/multipolar7 world, highlights a historical 
moment which launched norm and policy reformations, reevaluations and 
reconceptualization of neutrality in countries which had adjusted their policies more or 
less with Soviet Union in their minds. The movement towards Western and European 
organizations after the end of the Cold War implies that there were changes in political 
climate and security architecture, because countries such as Finland and Sweden were 
ready to step out of traditional neutrality, that had dominated their policies since the 
Second World War, into new kinds of concepts such as non-alignment which will be 
discussed in this section.   
 What comes to the relevant literature on post-Cold War and neutrality, authors 
                                                 
5
 Sweden applied before Finland – in 1991 and 1992 respectively 
6
 Arguably, NORDEFCO is a (defensive) military alliance. However, it is not politically related to neither of the 
two superpowers, namely USA and Russia that clash over NATO. Thus, despite NORDEFCO being a regional 
defence alliance, it does not create same kind of political tension as membership of NATO would in the cases of 
Finland and Sweden and therefore in this particular context NORDEFCO is not considered as a military alliance 
comparable to NATO.  
7
 Unipolar in the sense that after the collapse of Soviet Union, United States was the strongest state for a period 
of time. Currently, it is argued that world has moved from unipolarity to multipolarity with the rise of China and 
other BRICS countries. 
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seem to agree that while differences are case-specific, neutrality as a norm went through 
modifications, more so in Finland than in Sweden (Beyer and Hofmann 286). Beyer and 
Hoffman researched norm revision and decline from a constructivist perspective in post-
Cold War context and they have identified four interrelated reasons why and how states 
re-conceptualized neutrality vis-a-vis military organizations such as NATO: 
institutionalizing of neutrality, the de jure or de facto form of institutionalization, public 
opinion and political elite opinion (Beyer and Hofmann 286). Accordingly, normative 
change of neutrality was more considerable in Finland than in Sweden, because in the 
case of the former, neutrality was originally imposed by the Soviet Union and therefore 
as USSR collapsed, there was more room for a drastic change than in the case of the 
latter where neutrality was defined narrower with a long history (Beyer and Hofmann 
286). 
 However, it could be argued here that change of neutrality in Finland was much 
more relevant to security than norms, because in Finland’s case geopolitical and other 
practical factors are more important than norms. In Sweden, conversely, norms and 
values have always played a key role in policies, as will soon be developed. Reorientation 
from neutrality to military non-alignment8 in post-Cold War era has also been 
researched by Ferreira-Pereira and she argues that while neutral states moved from 
neutrocentrism to eurocentrism, they sustained non-membership status in NATO 
because of the lack of an external threat (Soviet Union/Russia) but participated in crisis 
management tasks, embracing the idea of evolving continuity (100-116). Interestingly, 
Moisio argues in his research that despite the collapse of the Soviet Union and changes in 
the security architecture of Finland, Russia and possible Russian threats were used as 
building blocks of Finnish national identity (Moisio 105-121) implying that there was an 
external threat, while authors like Ferreira-Pereira have argued the opposite (Ferreira-
Pereira 114). 
 The era of Post-Cold War neutrality can also be called the era of post-neutrality, 
which according to Möller and Bjereld means that neutrality continues its role as a 
                                                 
8
 Militarily non-aligned, military neutral or non-allied state can be politically aligned, but dismisses a military 
alliance. 
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guiding principle even if countries such as Finland and Sweden have turned towards a 
European mindset (367). Finland and Sweden hold on to the principle of neutrality while 
simultaneously agreeing to the Lisbon Treaty (article 42.7) which obliges member states 
to use force should another member state be attacked. Should European Union be seen 
as a military alliance because of the Lisbon Treaty, then would it mean that Finland and 
Sweden are not truly neutral? Or do Finland and Sweden hold on to the principle of 
neutrality so that it could be “exploited” when necessary? It could also be argued that in 
the context of EU’s common defence policy, Finland and Sweden are ad hoc neutral, as 
they participate in the common defence of member states of the European Union but 
remain neutral in relation to affairs outside European Union. As becomes apparent in the 
analytical section, neither Finland or Sweden see European Union as a military alliance, 
therefore in the context of the present research, European Union is not considered as a 
military alliance, thus in that sense Finland and Sweden remain neutral. This is because 
European Union is a very extensive political and economic union while NATO does not 
have the aspects of for example economic union but instead focuses strongly on military 
power and defence.  
 It has been identified that there has been a change from active and positive 
neutrality prior to EU membership to military non-alignment, military neutrality and 
non-membership of military alliances (Devine 356). Some have argued that the 
transformation from neutrality to post-neutrality is a result of changes in feedback 
mechanisms, meaning that Soviet era neutrality was not necessary for Finland after the 
collapse of USSR, while Sweden failed to upkeep an appropriate international role 
(Möller and Bjereld 379). Moreover, Agius has argued that change from neutrality to 
post-neutrality was not alone because of changes in external security but also because of 
a combination of subjectivity and ideas of self as a state as well as reconstitution of 
identity (371, 384). 
 In 2001, Forsberg and Vaahtoranta argued in their study on Finnish and Swedish 
post-neutrality that while Finland and Sweden are separated by history and geopolitics, 
there would now be more commonalities that have surfaced due to decreasing relevance 
of geopolitics as collapse of the Soviet Union changed the security environment and 
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because the two states joined EU simultaneously (68, 85). Möller and Bjereld argue that 
instead of commonalities in their post-neutral foreign policies, Finland and Sweden 
differ on their views on possible NATO membership and on their choice of military 
strategy, with Finland focusing on the strategic dimension while Sweden focuses on 
normative dimension (364, 374). Futhermore, by joining the European Union, both 
states moved from neutrality to political alignment, without giving up their military non-
alignment by staying outside NATO (Forsberg and Vaahtoranta 69). However, in the 
context of post-neutrality, neutrality in war was regarded as one of the options in both of 
the cases, while military non-alignment is also a peacetime option which is dependent 
on prevailing circumstances (Forsberg and Vaahtoranta 78-79). 
 The 21st century has been dominated by a number of major issues that have made 
states reconsider their foreign and security policies. The war against terror after 9/11 in 
2001, numerous terrorist attacks including the war against ISIS, as well as Ukraine Crisis 
and its aftermath with increased Russian activity outside its borders have had an effect. 
Interdependence and non-territorial security problems have realigned security 
priorities of militarily non-aligned states in forms of restructuring defence forces and 
increased involvement in for example NATO and EU security initiatives, according to 
Agius and Devine (266). They further argue that in this regard, neutrality and military 
non-alignment lack value in strategic sense, because security priorities have moved from 
issues such as territorial integrity to issues of for example terrorism and non-state actors, 
while being part of the European Union neutrality is arguably unsustainable (Agius and 
Devine 266). Moreover, the authors see neutrality as state-centric and antiquated 
because it does not respond to the actions that are to be taken against terrorism, all 
while the difference between internal and external security becomes less and thus the 
rationale for neutrality erodes (Agius and Devine 266). It is necessary to note, however, 
that the article of Agius and Devine was published well before the Ukraine Crisis and the 
changes in security environment that followed, which explains their view on neutrality 
as less valuable norm and policy.9 
 Interestingly, and against the argument of Agius and Devine on the 
                                                 
9
 Article of Agius and Devine was published in 2011. 
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unsustainability of neutrality, Goetschel identified in 2011 that neutrality as a policy has 
prevailed and the discussion of abolishing neutrality has disappeared (313). Goetschel 
focused on the connection between neutrals and peace building, and his main argument 
was that neutrality has a comparative advantage when it comes to channeling new ideas 
into international relations and that neutrals have the capability to further advance 
international norms as neutrals such as Finland and Sweden have a long idealistic and 
realistic history (313)10. Idealistic history in this case focuses on norms and values and 
for example promotion of non-violent means of conflict resolution, while realistic history 
is sovereignty sensitive and focuses on state survival (Goetschel 315, 317). Finally, what 
comes to the future of neutrality, Löden concludes that in attempting to forecast the 
future of neutrality in cases of Finland and Sweden, it is necessary to remark the changes 
in identity before a turn into new behavior as well as not consider the said changes as 
predetermined (280). 
Conclusion 
The literature review has introduced varieties of neutrality and ways how neutrality has 
been researched in scholarly world. Clear is that neutrality and its more contemporary 
forms such as military non-alignment, whether as norms or policies, have played a major 
role in the foreign and security policies of Finland and Sweden up to the present day. In 
order to fill the academic gap, it is vital to construct a contemporary view, which takes 
into consideration issues that are not yet found in academic literature, namely the role of 
the Ukraine crisis, the increased activity of Russia in the Baltic Sea region as well as the 
decaying relationship between NATO and Russia. The following research question has 
surfaced from the literature review: What implications the Finnish and Swedish traditions 
of neutrality have for the NATO membership of Finland and Sweden in the post-Ukraine 
crisis political climate? The following section introduces theoretical frameworks and the 
methodology used in this study. 
                                                 
10
 Promoting norms in the international community is seen as “norm entrepreneurialism”, this is discussed in 
more detail in Ingebritsen: “Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia's Role in World Politics” 2002; Finnemore and 
Sikkink: “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”1998. 
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Research design 
 
The purpose of this study is to research and evaluate implications the traditions of 
Finnish and Swedish neutrality have on possible NATO membership of Finland and 
Sweden, with the primary focus on the post-Ukraine crisis period. What has become 
apparent from the literature review is that neutrality has evolved and reformed 
throughout the 20th and 21st century according to the geopolitical situation and security 
architecture. The visible changes of neutrality in the aforementioned contexts emphasize 
the role of neutrality when it comes to policies and decision making and therefore it is 
necessary to further study if and how neutrality has evolved in the aftermath of Ukraine 
crisis and in what ways it attributes to the decisions that focus on NATO membership. 
The ways the Finnish and Swedish traditions of neutrality have changed underlines the 
path dependent nature of neutrality as a foreign policy tool. What is being argued here is 
that Finnish and Swedish neutrality and the ways it changes, or does not change, depend 
largely on the actions of Russia and history in general; therefore neutrality in the cases of 
both Finland and Sweden is path dependent. This chapter introduces two theoretical 
frameworks that follow the general lines of realism and constructivism, the method of 
content analysis, selected empirical data and will finally argue for the case selection and 
scope of the study. 
Theoretical Framework 
In order to capture neutrality and military non-alignment as both norm and as a foreign 
policy instrument, the present study has been built on the premises of constructivism 
and realism. These two frameworks have been chosen for the study because neither of 
the two can alone thoroughly explain the changes and the ways of how neutrality is used 
in international relations. Constructivism focuses strongly on domestic actors and non-
material structures, while realism focuses primarily on alliance formation, material 
structure and military power, and therefore a combination of the two theories - state's 
motivation to institutionalize a norm and alliance formation based on threat perception - 
provide an appropriate set of frameworks for the present study. 
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Constructivism: Norm Institutionalization 
To begin with, in the context of global politics and international relations, constructivism 
bases on three main tenets. These tenets are the relations between people; the mutual 
constitution of structures and agents; and finally, double hermeneutics which asserts 
that politics are interpretations which then are further interpreted by others (Pouliot 
425, 428-430, Agius 375). In principle, constructivists are ontologically interested in the 
social, ideational and normative factors that affect politics – how actions of social and 
political actors are driven by ideas, beliefs and values through non-material structures 
(Reus-Smit 196-197). Understanding the non-material structures helps to understand 
the interests and actions policy makers take, because according to constructivism 
actions cannot be explained through rational theory because they are not automatic 
reactions, but are actions that are influenced by norms and values and to some extent by 
material power (Reus-Smit 197, Ayukawa 424). 
 As a framework from the constructivist perspective, the present study applies the 
framework of norm institutionalization introduced by Möller and Bjereld. Möller and 
Bjereld researched post-neutrality in Finland and Sweden, but the scope of their 
research ended to the year 2010. The present study however, takes the analysis further, 
and moves the scope from 2010 to 2016. To begin with, institutionalizing a norm relies 
on factors (both material and non-material) that influence decisions behind maintaining 
the said norm, in this case neutrality. These factors are divided into strategic and 
normative dimensions, where the former focuses on security and territorial integrity 
while the latter focuses on identity and national autonomy (Möller and Bjereld 369). 
Strategic dimension understands for example that neutrality in international conflicts 
prevents a state from getting unwillingly involved, while normative dimension focuses 
on expressing an appropriate role in relation to neutral position and other states (Möller 
and Bjereld 369).11 These aforementioned factors have an impact on policies through 
path dependency – the conditions prior and/or at the moment of norm 
institutionalization shape the policy because policy creation is a social process and 
dependent on historical and political contexts (Möller and Bjereld 368; Pierson 252). 
                                                 
11
 Emphasis on original 
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Thus, for an idea or a norm to be institutionalized, it has to be embedded in an 
institution, such as a state, and it has to play a role on the motivation and perception of 
political actors (Berman 26). For a norm to remain institutionalized there needs to be 
positive feedbacks, i.e. state feels secure due to the norm, and lack of negative feedbacks 
that could cause norm revision (Möller and Bjereld 369). Accordingly, strategic feedback 
is concerned with for example territorial integrity, while normative feedback concerns 
predominant national narrative and international role (Möller and Bjereld 369).  Thus, 
by using security and international role as feedback mechanisms, the present study is 
able to demonstrate motivation and persistence of the institutionalization of neutrality 
as a norm, which helps to understand the role of normative neutrality in today's foreign 
policy, not only in the selected cases but also in a general level. 
Realism: Balance of Threat  
 Classical (Hobbesian) realism assumes that the world lacks an international government 
or hierarchy (thus there is anarchy in the world), which in combination with statist 
egoism and competition leads to power politics and issues on security and trust. 
“Waltzian” neo-realism, however, focuses purely on state's capabilities (Waltz 99), which 
means that political structures are based on distribution of power as well as on 
differentiation and allocation of political functions (Donnelly 35) or simply that states 
seek to survive in the international system (Walt 1998: 31). This theory is also known as 
the theory of balance of power, by Kenneth Waltz, which asserts that there is a balance of 
power and feeling of national security when no one state is stronger and capable of 
dominating other states and  power is equally distributed in the global system (Little 
129-130, 132-133). However, the problem with balance of power theory is that it rather 
exclusively works in relation with great powers such as United States and Russia or, in a 
more contemporary and topical setting, with NATO and Russia. 
 While the present study focuses on two relatively small states that are located in 
the near vicinity of a great power, a reformulation of balance of power into the 
framework of balance of threat by Stephen M. Walt is appropriate because it gives a 
framework to study alliance preferences of smaller states. Walt, among others, has 
argued that states, especially small ones, form and join alliances to protect themselves in 
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anarchical international system (Walt viii).  Walt’s seminal argument is that threat is 
what determines actions of small states while the role of power depends on how it is 
used, where it is located and what it is capable of doing (viii). According to his theory, 
Walt offers two options small states can have in case of a threat: balancing and 
bandwagoning. The former implies that a state allies against a threat and the latter that a 
state aligns with the actual threat in hopes to avert an (another) attack (Walt 17). To 
understand why states balance or bandwagon, Walt identified four factors (other than 
power) that affect the level of threat to both the direction of balancing and 
bandwagoning. First factor is aggregate power, which highlights the role of military 
capability, population and for example technological advancement (Walt 22), while the 
second factor is geographic proximity (23) which is simply the distance to the possible 
threat. Third factor identified by Walt is offensive power, which highlights a state's ability 
to threaten for example the territorial integrity of another state (24) and the fourth and 
final factor is aggressive intentions which determines the level of a state is perceived to 
be aggressive, as for example in the case of Nazi Germany (25). For the purpose of the 
present study, the framework of balance of threat is operationalized, because it helps to 
understand neutrality in connection to the four aforementioned factors and because 
they play a great role on a country deciding whether to join an alliance. While the 
aforementioned factors strongly depend on ways they are perceived, it is important 
remember that history as well as culture affect the way states perceive intentions, thus  
some Russian actions can, for example, be perceived as aggressive due to history like in 
the case of Finland.  
 To recapitulate, the theoretical framework in this study consists of two theories. 
When analyzing neutrality as a norm, thus as a core tenet of both domestic politics and 
international relations, the constructivist framework follows the framework norm 
institutionalization by Möller and Bjereld. What comes to neutrality and alliance 
formation, Walt's balance of threat theory covers external issues, through analyzing the 
four factors12 that affect the extent threat is perceived in the two selected cases. The two 
theories are combined in the analytical section in order to understand the path 
                                                 
12
 Aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power and aggressive intentions 
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dependency of Finnish and Swedish neutrality and how it affects today’s decision 
making.  
Methodology – Directed Content Analysis to Balance of Threat and Norm 
Institutionalization 
The two selected frameworks for the present study were introduced in the previous 
section, and in this section their application will be further elaborated on. In order to 
analyze neutrality within the framework of norm institutionalization and balance of 
threat, this study engages directed content analysis, comparatively on the two cases of 
Finland and Sweden.  Directed content analysis provides the present study a platform for 
deducting content and occurrence of phenomenon from the selected documents while 
engaging with the theoretical frameworks that help to further understand and analyze 
neutrality in the context of post-Ukraine crisis foreign policy. 
 In general, content analysis is a study of meanings and inscription in different 
forms of documentation such as books and journals (Prior 360; Bos and Tarnai 660), and 
it includes approaches that systematically analyze codified data through categorization -
either quantitatively or qualitatively. Qualitative content analyses are forms of data 
analysis that are applied to context-dependent meaning (Schreier 173) and are 
atheoretical, giving emphasis on the informational content of the data without any 
method related theoretical limitations (Forman and Damschroder 40). Furthermore, 
qualitative content analysis analyses words and meanings that are either deductively or 
inductively collected from the sources, aiming at providing a detailed description of the 
material that is analyzed (Schreier 173). Directed approach aims to validate a theoretical 
framework (Hsieh and Shannon 1281), which in the case of the present study are the 
balance of threat theory and the theory on motivation on institutionalizing and creating 
a norm. Focusing on historical context and meaning serves a useful base for the current 
study because the goal is to understand a phenomenon of neutrality in foreign policy 
rather than making generalizations based on statistics  (Bos and Tarnai 661; Forman and 
Damschroder 60; Hsieh and Shannon 1284).  Directed content analysis is appropriate for 
the present study, because it helps through qualitative analysis to emphasize the context 
and content of the selected data while not interfering with the theoretical frameworks. 
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Thus, directed content analysis is fitting for this study because analyzing the context and 
content are crucial for the selected theoretical frameworks because historical context 
and the informational content create foundational basis for both constructivist and 
realist perspectives. 
 The directed content analysis is applied to two cases within the set theoretical 
frameworks. For this study, Finland and Sweden have been chosen as case studies for 
several reasons. These countries are geopolitically very significant in differing ways. 
Finland shares a long 1300 km border with Russia and is located by a sea that is 
strategically very significant to Russia. Sweden on one hand, does not share a border 
with Russia, but on the other hand, is too located by the same important sea. 
Strategically speaking, Sweden and Finland are located critically – NATO on one side and 
Russia on the other, with little strategic options should the situation suddenly get worse. 
For Sweden, Finland serves as a buffer zone between Sweden and Russia. Furthermore, 
these two states cooperate closely through formal and informal channels and thus have 
relatively homogenous view to the issue at hand. Analyzing two cases, which are 
perceived relatively similar but in reality have differences in their policies both in 
normative and pragmatic sense, allows deeper understanding on the implications 
neutrality has for possible NATO membership. These similarities as well as differences 
are further elaborated on in the analytical section. As was established in the literature 
review, Finland and Sweden both have long histories as neutral states, but due to 
different geopolitical situation, their focus has been on different things. Finland has 
focused, due to an intricate history with Russia, on the strategic side of neutrality while 
Sweden has throughout its history emphasized normative neutrality. As will be 
established, both Finland and Sweden have implicated that the security environment in 
the Baltic Sea region has changed and therefore both of the states have very recently 
renewed their foreign and security policies. Both Finland and Sweden cooperate with 
NATO closely through the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and through the 
Enhanced Opportunities Program (EOP), and both of these states signed Memorandum 
of Understanding with NATO, more specifically the Host Nation Support Agreement, in 
2014 to deepen the cooperation. For these aforementioned reasons Finland and Sweden 
serve as pertinent cases for analysis as despite their similarities, the cases in the end are 
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most different because of their different focus on both normative and strategic neutrality. 
 The scope of the present study is set to the political climate after Ukrainian Crisis 
because it is when the situation between NATO and Russia, or alternatively between the 
West and the East, deteriorated. To protect her interests, Russia annexed the Crimea 
peninsula in early 2014 which caused movement in the NATO camp and which later on 
escalated to other hostile/provocative actions in the Baltic Sea region in forms of 
airspace violations et cetera. Furthermore, after the Crimean annexation, NATO has 
relocated troops to the Baltic states in fears of further Russian provocations and 
hostilities. Due to the Russian actions in Crimea as well as the Baltic Sea region, both 
Finland and Sweden have indicated that their security environment has changed, and 
this becomes apparent in the analytical part where the new foreign and security policies 
of Finland and Sweden are analyzed. 
 As the level of analysis is a state, the data used for analysis consists of the most 
recent foreign and security policies (White Papers) of Finland and Sweden, 
governmental sources, as well as the speeches and discussions including those that took 
place in “Kultarantakeskustelu” on 19th and 20th of June, in Naantali, Finland. 
Kultarantakeskustelu was hosted by the President of Finland, Sauli Niinistö and among 
the discussants and speakers were the Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven, Swedish 
and Finnish ambassadors, members of parliaments and other relevant people.  These 
sources were selected for the present study because they are very topical and up to date, 
and they demonstrate the current level and type of discussion that is taking place on the 
governmental level in both countries. Furthermore, due to the limitations and the scope 
of the present study, the data selected for the present study has been filtered so that it 
fits a narrow conception of security – namely the national security on level of state as 
well as territorial integrity, without taking into account for example issues such as 
terrorism or environmental issues. By observing such sources the present study is able 
to establish the normative and strategic use of neutrality in foreign policies in the 
context of post-Ukraine crisis political climate in the Baltic Sea region. 
 The following section analyses the findings of the research conducted according 
to the aforementioned methodology and theories. 
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Analysis 
The previous section introduced the two theoretical frameworks as well as methodology 
that are used in conducting the analysis.  By applying the frameworks of norm 
institutionalization and balance of threat through the method of directed content 
analysis, the analysis presents how neutrality works and possibly prevails as a normative 
and as a strategic instrument in foreign and security policies. The sources under analysis 
collectively discuss several things. Both Sweden and Finland have identified structural 
changes in their security environment and have adjusted their foreign and security 
policies accordingly to the prevailing political climate. As a measure of securing 
independence and territorial integrity, Finland and Sweden aim to build up their 
defensive capabilities within the coming five to ten years. Furthermore, while both 
countries advocate further cooperation with NATO, discussions about membership have 
surfaced and have simultaneously reached the level of seriousness that was last present 
during the Cold War. Also, the tense environment has last been present only during the 
Cold War. This section is divided into two parts, which follow the aforementioned 
theoretical frameworks.   
Norm Institutionalization 
The findings are discussed here within the framework of norm institutionalization by 
Möller and Bjereld (2010). In theory, improving a state’s security could lead to neutral 
position; in practice, however, neutrality is based on a mix of fulfillment of an 
international role, national security and conception of national identity (Möller and 
Bjereld 367-368).13 Accordingly, national interests and identity become important parts 
of the institutionalized idea (Möller and Bjereld 368), which in the case of the present 
study is neutrality.  Thus, the context of the present study and the core of the framework 
of norm institutionalization require analyzing the conditions and motivation why 
neutrality remains institutionalized in 2016. 
 Neutrality has been a foreign policy option for both Finland and Sweden for most 
                                                 
13
  Depending on a case, the three factors, namely international role, national security and national identity can 
be emphasized differently. For example, Sweden emphasizes international role while Finland might emphasize 
national security more than international role.  
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of the 20th century, and Sweden has been at peace for over 200 years.  Events such as the 
Cold War and entering the European Union have changed the nature of the norm, yet the 
basis has always remained – both states remain as bystanders to great power politics by 
staying outside military alliances in both peace and wartime. Because of history and the 
relative success of neutrality as a foreign policy for both Finland and Sweden, it could be 
argued that neutrality has become so embedded – through path dependency - into the 
norms and values of both the citizens and the political elite, that despite changes in 
security environment, people do not think that neutral stance would betray them “this 
time” either. An outsider, however, could expect that with the changes in security 
environment after the Ukraine Crisis, there could be a change in the normative nature of 
neutrality. With this expectation in mind, let’s first focus on the findings that yield from 
the analysis when looking into national security, a strategic dimension, as a feedback 
mechanism. 
Strategic Dimension - Security 
  Finland and Sweden have identified dramatic changes in their close vicinity – the 
Baltic Sea has been a theatre of Russian hostile action, varying from military exercises to 
other provocative activities, such as the harassment of USS Donald Cook few months 
prior to finalizing this research. Russian planes have flown unauthorized in the airspaces 
of both Finland and Sweden while Baltic states have demanded for NATO's presence in 
order to deter Russia from further hostile activities. Simultaneously, however, Russia has 
expressed that NATO’s eastward expansion and aims of moving military personnel to the 
Baltic states without forgetting the military exercises are threatening Russian interests.14 
Therefore, the atmosphere is extremely tense and volatile. These changes and the 
volatile atmosphere become apparent in numerous speeches, reports and White Papers, 
in which Russian actions, not only in Ukraine and Crimea but also in the Baltic Sea region, 
are deeply condemned.  Despite Finland and Sweden being highly responsive to threats 
in not only in their neighborhood but also in a more global setting, both of these states 
                                                 
14
 Russia seems to continue share the globe into spheres of influence, and NATO’s eastward expansion has, in 
cases such as the Baltic states, gone on Russian sphere of influence. It is also generally understood that the 
Russo-Georgian crisis of 2008 is somewhat directly linked to Georgian aims of joining NATO – Russian actions 
in Georgia were thus a response to changes that were about to take place in its sphere of influence.  
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declared in their most recent White Papers that neither of these states are members of 
any military alliances (Prime Minister's Office 2016; Försvarsdepartementet 2015). 
 Non-participation in military alliances as a suitable foreign policy option has been 
further referred to in a number of occasions, for example in the Kultaranta talks by 
several panelists and in speeches of both Finnish and Swedish foreign ministers. The 
Swedish Defence Minister emphasizes in his speech that Sweden has a two-tiered foreign 
and defence policy – military non-alignment is the basis onto which reinforcements of 
the military capability and deepening cooperation are built on (Hultqvist 2016).  
Furthermore, Sweden's goal is to continue the path of neutrality but also to continue 
creating bilateral relations with countries such as United States and Germany, in case of a 
situation in which Swedish neutrality is breached by actions of other states (Berquist 
2016). At the same occasion, former Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that in the 
case of Finland, it is important to have Finnish motives as unambiguous as possible, 
while making sure that the credibility of Finnish defence mechanisms increase 
(Tuomioja 2016). Moreover, Finnish foreign and security policy lies on its membership 
in European and Nordic communities, while bearing its global responsibility as an 
independent state and in pursuit of strengthening Finland's international position 
(Prime Minister's Office 6-7). 
 Due to the tense environment in the Baltic Sea region, both Finland and Sweden 
show a change in the military dimension of security. National autonomy and territorial 
integrity have returned to the core of security, which feeds to the importance of 
neutrality as an instrument of foreign policy. In the period between the end of the Cold 
War and the Ukraine Crisis there was no “obvious” reason for neutrality, as during that 
period, Russia was not considered as a threat. Consequently, during that period, both 
Finland and Sweden extended their global participation and moved away from national 
focus. Today the focus is back on national security, independence and territorial integrity.  
 These findings yield several implications on security as a feedback mechanism 
when it comes to norm institutionalization. Despite the somewhat negative feedback 
Finland and Sweden have received, it does not seem to be enough for them to find it 
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necessary to move away from institutionalized neutrality. Instead, both states respond to 
the changes through other means, namely by deepening cooperation with bi- and 
multilateral organizations and institutions, and by investing in defence mechanisms and 
infrastructures. These actions serve national interests. Moreover, both Finland and 
Sweden seem to understand that joining NATO while the situation is tense and volatile 
would not serve national interests in same ways as remaining militarily non-aligned 
does. 
Normative Dimension – International Role  
 What comes to the normative dimension and especially to international role as a 
feedback mechanism, the two countries under analysis act relatively similar. Historically, 
Finland and Sweden have a long legacy of neutrality and through the knowledge both 
countries have gained, they have been able to remain impartial to great power politics. 
Both Finland and Sweden have strong international roles when it comes to participating 
in crisis management, cooperation on security issues, human rights et cetera. Both states 
highlight the role of the European Union as the basis of not only foreign policies and 
security, but for other political issues as well. Despite European Union lacking the 
military capabilities to deal with (large scale) strategic issues such as the one of the 
Baltic Sea region, EU is important because it still is a part of both Finnish and Swedish 
identities. By belonging to a European institution, the countries feel unity and 
convergence which emphasizes not only military but also normative engagement to 
issues. As neutrals, Finland and Sweden emphasize the role of United Nations by 
participating in numerous peacekeeping missions and other humanitarian programs as 
this feeds to security in many levels. Furthermore, Sweden has been voted as a non-
permanent member to the UN Security Council, in which neutrality becomes ever more 
crucial as the council is where opposites, such as United States and Russia, discuss.  
  In the Kultaranta talks, the Swedish Prime Minister Löfven emphasized in his 
keynote speech Sweden's global status based on non-alignment, solidarity and 
cooperation, while President Niinistö in his opening remarks focused more on the 
changed security environment and how it effects the bilateral cooperation between 
Finland and Sweden (Löfven 2016, Niinistö 2016). Moreover, Sweden has launched a 
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feminist foreign policy specifically to remove issues that are, for example, related to 
gender and inequality. Finland has, however, worked as a mediator and as a messenger 
between Washington and Kremlin, as becomes apparent in an interview of President 
Niinistö (Lauren). This emphasizes the special role neutral states can have – they can 
work as neutral grounds for dialogue between great powers and others if deemed 
necessary. A very topical example of this is president Putin’s visit to Finland the coming 
weekend, where Finland can continue and contribute to the “European dialogue between 
Russia and the West” (Blencowe and de Fresnes 2016).15 The meeting is extremely 
important because it is Putin’s first visit to an EU member state after the Brexit vote and 
because of the coming NATO Warsaw summit in July. Therefore, international role of a 
neutral state especially in the current inflamed situation is very important as because of 
their neutral status they are able to contribute to international peace as well as security, 
while joining a military alliance at the current situation might only lead to worsening of 
the atmosphere. 
    It can be argued, on the basis of the findings, that Finland and Sweden seem to 
believe that joining a military alliance would not serve their purpose and goals in a 
global setting. Both Finland and Sweden actively contribute and participate in global 
missions and programs, and joining a military alliance at the moment could only cause 
the situation to worsen. By contributing to the common good, both Finland and Sweden 
are included in the international community, without the aspect of a military alliance 
that would in the current situation be very dangerous. Furthermore, when taking the 
current situation into account, neutrality contributes to the level of security in the Baltic 
Sea region as well as in the Northern Europe as a whole. Finland and Sweden actively 
contribute to NORDEFCO and have strong bi-lateral relations with, for example, Norway 
and the United States.  However, in the current circumstances, joining a military alliance 
which is strongly dependent on a state that is considered as an enemy by Russia would 
not contribute to international stability and security in the ways neutrality does. 
                                                 
15
 The meeting turned out ever more important because president Niinistö proposed president Putin to consider 
Russian planes to return to the use transponders when flying in the Baltic Sea region, as a confidence-building 
measure between Russia and NATO. Putin accepted the proposal and has later on organized a meeting as a 
continuation to the NATO Warsaw gathering, with relevant counterparts. This shows the importance of neutrals 
as messengers between conflicted counterparts. ( Yle.fi 1.7.2016 , accessed 30.8.2016 
http://yle.fi/uutiset/putin_agrees_to_finnish_proposal_on_aircraft_transponders/8999141) 
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Balance of Threat 
In this section, the findings are discussed within the framework of balance of threat by 
Stephen M. Walt.  The said theoretical framework helps to understand the realist and 
strategic side of neutrality and how factors such as aggregate power, geographic 
proximity, offensive power and aggressive intentions of a possibly hostile state affecting 
neutrality as a foreign policy strategy. 
 External threat exists – Russia is perceived as unpredictable, hostile and as a state 
that does not honor international laws - and this is clearly asserted in the newest 
Swedish White Paper (2015: 22).  Few years back, both Finland and Sweden focused on 
multinational cooperation and crisis management, and national defence seemed to be a 
distant idea as both Finland and Sweden had drastically reduced defence budgets, the 
latter more so than the former. Sweden for example ended its conscript service, while 
Finland continued it, but closed up or combined several military bases, leaving areas 
such as Northern Finland without an air force base. This happened primarily because it 
was assumed that an external threat, such as a weaponized attack from another state, 
would be highly unlikely. Today, however, both Finland and Sweden focus on 
strengthening their defensive mechanisms. Sweden, for example, is basing a permanent 
mechanized battle group at the island of Gotland, an important strategic location in the 
Baltic Sea. Finland, then, has very recently passed a law which allows for orders to 
rapidly re-train reservists, should the security situation so demand.  Furthermore, the 
changes in security environment are noticeable. After two decades of declining defence 
spending and due to new national objectives, both Finland and Sweden aim for 
reforming their national defence mechanisms: for example, compared to previous period, 
Swedish Armed Forces receive approximately 1.8 billion euros extra to both military and 
civilian defence for the period of 2016-2020 to update their “total defence” of which 
national security is a big component of (Försvarsdepartementet 2015). New national 
objectives are also visible in Finland. As one of the most recent defense related 
discussions is the possible change in the Conscription Act which would allow training 
conscripts as standby units (Huhtanen 2016). This would mean that conscript forces 
would be the first forces an enemy would face in the moment of a “surprise” attack, and 
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that this would allow more time for the reserve forces to get ready (Huhtanen 2016). 
According to the Defence Minister Niinistö, these changes as well as the overall readiness 
have become increasingly important after what happened in Crimea (Tolkki 2016). Thus, 
it can be argued that military doctrines have refocused from international to national 
issues.  
 According to the framework of balance of threat, states have two options: 
balancing and bandwagoning against a threat. Bandwagoning is not an option because it 
would mean that the neutral states would have to ally with Russia and such a change 
would be rather utopist. Furthermore, in the case of bandwagoning Finland and Sweden 
would most likely have to abandon EU, NATO cooperation and most likely all the other 
“Western minded” organizations. Balancing, however, can in this case have different 
levels. Full balancing would mean that Finland and Sweden would join NATO, and this 
would be likely only in the case of a total war, if even then. Finland and Sweden can also 
practice self-sustained, internal balancing through national methods, namely reform and 
strengthen their territorial defence.  
As for the four factors by Walt, all four can be applied to Russia. To repeat briefly, 
the four factors are: aggregate power which is about military capabilities, population and 
technological advancement (Walt 22); geographic proximity that is the distance to a 
threatening state/entity (Walt 23); offensive power, which highlights state’s ability to 
threaten another state’s territorial integrity (Walt 24). The fourth and final factor is 
aggressive intentions, which can for example be the level a state is perceived to be 
aggressive (Walt 25).  Firstly, Russia possesses aggregate power. Since 2008, Russia has 
undergone comprehensive reform of the armed forces and the capacity increases until 
2020s, which enables Russia to conduct operations in its immediate surroundings 
(Försvarsdepartementet 2015). Russia also has a nuclear arsenal and the size of its 
armed forces is large compared to those of Finland and Sweden, just as is the size of the 
population. Russia also possesses the ability to use hybrid means or other ambiguous 
operations (Berquist et al.15) Secondly, Russia is in the geographic proximity of 
especially Finland but also Sweden. Finland and Russia share land border of up to 
1300km. The role of Baltic Sea is also very important, because it is the only waterway 
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from St. Petersburg to Kaliningrad enclave. The same waterway is important to both 
Finland and Sweden, without forgetting all of the Baltic States and therefore it possesses 
strategic value. It is also important to remember that there is no land route to 
Kaliningrad from Russia that would not go through another state, thus only way for 
Russia to access the enclave is by sea. Thirdly, Russia has shown its ability to use 
offensive power in numerous incidents, not only in the Baltic Sea region but also globally 
in cases such as the Ukraine Crisis, the Russo-Georgian diplomatic crisis of 2008 and so 
on. Finally, aggressive intentions of Russia have become clear in occasions that have 
already been discussed earlier in this study.   
As the four aforementioned factors can be applied to Russia in ways that are 
concerning for Finland and Sweden, the factors and their connection to Russia have 
implications for the foreign and security policies of Finland and Sweden. Because of the 
four factors, both states have found it necessary to revise their policies and to strongly 
invest into updating and renewing defensive measures. Also, these factors set some 
limitations – because of the strong Russian military force, its assertiveness and its 
policies, both Finland and Sweden need to consider their policies ever more carefully. 
The four factors by Walt to which Russia’s case can be applied would not be so relevant 
should Finland and Sweden be located on the other side of the world, but, due to these 
factors, it is impossible and irresponsible to ignore a strong and unpredictable neighbor 
when deciding on foreign and security policies. It is, however, important to keep in mind 
that if these aggressive intentions are looked at from a Russian perspective; they are not 
necessarily seen as aggressive but as defensive. In the end, Russia perceives NATO’s 
actions as threats to its territorial integrity as well as a step on Russia’s sphere of 
influence. 
What is apparent from the findings is that Finland and Sweden balance internally 
by increasing their defence budgets dramatically and that both remain outside NATO or 
other alliances of purely military nature.16 While these two states are active members of 
the EU and NORDEFCO, both states extensively invest on updating their national security 
                                                 
16
 As mentioned on a footnote on page 6, NORDEFCO and European Union are not considered as a military 
alliance comparable to NATO.  
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measures, as became apparent above. Russia is perceived as a threat, but so far 
normative neutrality weighs more than realism, as neither Sweden nor Finland find 
NATO membership as a fit solution.  Instead, Sweden is focusing on territorial defence 
while Finland practices deterrence by denial (Berquist et al 15), which means that 
Finland attempts to convince the attacker that the attack will be defeated and 
operational goals will not be reached (Yost 2003). Simultaneously, both Finland and 
Sweden openly discuss security and foreign policy matters, because openly discussing a 
possible NATO membership is a signal to Russia that their neighbors are not pleased 
with their actions and that the neighbors have available options should the situation 
change.  
Conclusion 
This study has discussed the evolving nature of neutrality and its role in today's foreign 
and security policies. By applying the theoretical frameworks of norm 
institutionalization and balance of threat, the study has been able to come to the 
following conclusion. The security environment at the Baltic Sea region has changed. 
Because of the said change, both Finland and Sweden have, on one hand, revised their 
foreign and security policies, and on the other hand, have found it necessary to reform 
their national defence mechanisms. 
 What comes to norm institutionalization, it is clear that neutrality as a norm is 
strongly embedded in not only the Swedish and Finnish histories and societies but also 
in the decision making. While the security environment at the Baltic Sea region has 
changed, neither of these two states have perceived enough negative security feedback 
so that the norm and policy of military non-alignment would have to be changed to for 
example a military alliance with NATO. The option remains, but in today's situation it is 
not used unless there is a dramatic change – yet in which using the option might turn out 
unwise. As for international role as a security feedback, both Finland and Sweden find bi- 
and multilateral cooperation with NATO and the European Union very important, and 
both emphasize the role of the European Union as the basis for security in Europe. 
Findings in the light of the framework of balance of threat suggest that both Finland and 
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Sweden are internally balancing against a possible threat on their own by reforming and 
strengthening their defence mechanisms, yet balancing by joining a military alliance is 
not seen necessary or even a plausible option at the current situation. As 
aforementioned, Finland and Sweden rely to a large extent on European Union and its 
solidarity and common interests, which to an extent can be seen as a balancing act as 
well.  Furthermore, national security has become the primary issue in their foreign and 
security policies. 
 Military non-alignment as a foreign policy instrument prevails in both Finland 
and Sweden. Thus, neutrality has a number of normative and security related 
implications for a possible NATO membership. Firstly, neutrality as a norm has served 
both Finland and Sweden well and it may do so for an unpredictable period of time 
because the path dependency of Finnish and Swedish tradition has remained unchanged. 
Secondly, neutrality as a norm is sort of a security guarantee for Finland and Sweden – it 
can be argued that should the states now join NATO, there would be definite 
consequences from Russian side because Russia perceives NATO's actions and 
enlargement as a threat. Thirdly, neutrality serves not only Finland and Sweden, but also 
the international community – through the neutral status both Finland and Sweden are 
able to contribute not only to the national or regional security but to global security by 
for example helping with dialogue between belligerents. Finally, it can be argued that 
Russian aggressions at the Baltic Sea region are primarily aimed at NATO or at testing 
NATO’s reactions and not ultimately at the neutrals. Despite the increased insecurity at 
the Baltic Sea region, the normative side of neutrality weighs more in the scale of Finnish 
and Swedish policymakers, than weighs the realist side. Therefore, until the national 
defence mechanisms as deterrence have been proven futile, neutrality as a norm will 
prevail and Finland and Sweden shall remain outside a military alliance. 
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